I know folks do not like to read opposite opinions on what they already have made their minds up on. I also know they do not want to read a lot anyway.
I post these things just for information from another viewpoint not to change folk’s minds.
But this is a good link about this issue.
I will post the whole article but highlight the key parts.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/16/usa-china-ukraine-taiwan-credibility-resolve/
What the United States Does in Ukraine Won’t Matter in Taiwan
Despite the historical evidence, this bogus credibility claim still drives U.S. foreign policy.
The war in Ukraine has provided its fair share of surprises. The Ukrainian army’s gritty resistance continues to surpass the expectations of military analysts in the West. The Russian army, which seemed so formidable on paper, has turned out to be a clunky, ineffective colossus with poor leadership at the top and little motivation at the bottom, its troops serving as cannon fodder in the Donbas.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, once thought of as a master strategist and savvy opportunist, has exposed himself as a mere mortal whose obsession with personal glory has both degraded his country’s geopolitical position—to take one example, NATO will soon have two additional members, one of which, Finland, shares a long border with Russia—and harmed its future prospects.
The war has deprived Russia of its most lucrative energy market, cut it off from Western banking services and technology, increased its dependence on China economically and politically, and exacerbated its demographic problems by prompting hundreds of thousands of its young people to flee the country, if they haven’t already been killed fighting.
What the U.S. government may or may not do in one region of the world tells us next to nothing about what it might do in another.
The one constant element in this slew of surprises has been the familiar claim that U.S. credibility is on the line and will rise or fall depending on the war’s result and that Ukraine must therefore be provided the weaponry it needs to prevail.
The logic underlying this assertion can be summarized as follows: If the United States does not stand firm against an adversary like Russia, some other rival, somewhere else, even one located far afield, will be emboldened to test the limits of America’s resolve. In short, every region is connected and every decision the United States makes will have global ramifications.
Invoking credibility has long been a favorite pastime for many foreign-policy luminaries in part because it provides a simple explanation for complicated international events that may lack a single answer. The obsession with credibility is hardly limited to the United States. The Soviet Union, for instance, partly justified its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan as a way to demonstrate its credibility to other Soviet-aligned governments and movements around the world. France’s president at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, reportedly regarded France’s leadership role in the 2011 intervention against Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi as a way to shore up its reputation in the Arab world.
If international politics is all about maintaining credibility, then other factors that help us understand why leaders act the way they do—including individual psychology, the desire for prestige, or calculations related to the balance of power—can be ignored.
The war in Ukraine has occasioned much simplistic analysis along these lines. The examples are endless. Former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt traced Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and opined that the Kremlin “took note” of Washington’s impatience and lack of staying power.
This January, Sen. Lindsey Graham asserted that Taiwan’s fate could actually hinge on the what happened on Ukraine’s battlefields. “If Putin gets away with this,” he warned, “there goes Taiwan.” Rep. Michael McCaul, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, echoed this same point during a television appearance: “If Ukraine falls, Chairman Xi [Jinping] in China’s going to invade Taiwan.”
Not one of these claims is supported by solid evidence. In fact, there is a substantial amount of scholarship on the significance of credibility, and the findings lead to the opposite conclusion. For instance, in Calculating Credibility, a seminal work on the subject, Dartmouth University professor Daryl Press concludes that leaders assess a nation’s credibility on whether it has the interest and power to deliver on a threat—not on what it did in the past in a completely unrelated context.
In short, what the U.S. government may or may not do in one region of the world tells us next to nothing about what it might do in another. The U.S. decision to extricate itself from a failing two-decade war in Afghanistan may therefore prove of little value in predicting how it might react were Russia to attack Eastern Europe.
To believe otherwise is not only misplaced; it’s dangerous, because such reasoning could lead the U.S. government to make choices—like continuing a war that it cannot win or intervening in conflicts that are of scant consequence to U.S. interests—that waste its resources, all in the name of credibility.
Unfortunately, the United States has a tragic history of doing precisely that. The U.S. military was mired in a failing war in Vietnam partly due to the belief that calling it quits might induce the Soviet leadership to test American resolve in Europe, encourage adversaries around the world, and undermine U.S. alliances in Asia. Three decades later, the United States found itself stuck in yet another civil war, this time in Afghanistan, motivated in part by the conviction that allowing the Taliban to prevail would lead adversaries and competitors to doubt Washington’s staying power in the face of dogged resistance.
A more recent version of this logic was the prediction that pulling out of Afghanistan would lead allies everywhere to question the reliability of U.S. security assurances. Some NATO allies were either opposed to the U.S. withdrawal or dismayed by the manner in which Washington implemented it. Yet a year and a half later, those same allies clamor for an even deeper U.S. commitment to Europe. Their worries about Washington’s credibility have been pushed to the periphery.
Republican lawmakers aren’t the only ones who brandish the credibility thesis to burnish their hawkish credentials. Some Democratic legislators, such as Sen. Richard Blumenthal, have suggested that China may be sizing up the U.S. military’s behavior toward Ukraine as it plans for military action against Taiwan. China “is watching what we do in Ukraine,” Blumenthal said during a television interview last year. “That’s why we need to provide more humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and [impose] stronger sanctions.”
As Putin massed his troops along Ukraine’s border, one pundit warned that “China is watching. If Putin can invade Ukraine, Taiwan may be next.” A year into the invasion, experts at a prominent Washington think tank made the same argument—the United States must be unflinching in backing Kyiv lest its lack of steadiness convey weakness to Beijing and tempt the People’s Liberation Army to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.
These sweeping prognostications, unsupported by solid evidence, amount to wild, airy claims.
Consider Xi and Taiwan. Unification with Taiwan—peacefully, if possible; forcibly, if necessary—is doubtless one of the Chinese Communist Party’s highest priorities. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang reiterated this on March 7 after an annual meeting of the National People’s Congress. But how likely is it that Xi would take such a momentous action, which attacking Taiwan would certainly be, based on what the United States does or does not do in Ukraine?
Chinese leaders’ decisions relating to Taiwan are far more likely to be influenced by the strength and durability of the U.S. military presence in East Asia.
Given the damage that an invasion of Taiwan could do to China’s own wealth and power, it’s not very likely. There can be no doubt that Beijing realizes that Chinese military casualties would be high and the risk of nuclear war substantial if the U.S. government rushed to Taiwan’s defense. Shock waves would course through the global economy: Global supply chains would be severely disrupted, stock values would plummet, interest rates and energy prices would skyrocket.
Chinese leaders’ decisions relating to Taiwan are far more likely to be influenced by the strength and durability of the U.S. military presence in East Asia, the capacity of Taiwan’s armed forces, and the degree to which the United States is increasing military cooperation with allies and partners, such as Japan, Australia, India, and Vietnam—countries that have a shared interest in balancing Chinese power.
Despite the military and economic costs, it is certainly possible that Xi might still order his military commanders to attack the island. But his choices will be shaped by other factors, chief among them his assessment of whether the military balance of power in East Asia favors China enough to take a gamble and whether China could prevail without having to fight a long, bloody war that would sap its military and economic strength.
Xi will also ponder whether the benefits of reunifying Taiwan with the Chinese mainland are worth the inevitable economic consequences associated with such a war; after all, China’s future as a great power, as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy, depends on sustaining its trading relationships and economic success.
Today’s China is deeply connected to the global economy through investments, trade, energy prices, infrastructure projects, and complicated supply chains, all of which are critical to Chinese production and employment. Would Xi risk jeopardizing all of this for the sake of acquiring Taiwan, particularly now that Ukraine has demonstrated just how costly, not to mention unpredictable, wars of aggression can be?
The problems that Russia has run up against in Ukraine—not how resolute the United States proved to be in helping that country or how American leaders acted in some other unrelated crisis—will matter much more in determining Xi’s choices related to Taiwan.
Despite overwhelming evidence that balance-of-power dynamics in a particular context are the North Star of countries’ foreign-policy choices, the credibility thesis remains ubiquitous in American popular discourse. It won’t disappear overnight. Still, scholars should challenge its claims relentlessly in order to chip away at its influence.
At any rate. Just posting this to show there are non-political analyst's views on this that actually have studied it and come to the exact opposite conclusion as Graham does. To me, he is being disingenuous for political reasons, if not financial reasons. He absolutely knows his stance is not supported by evidence. It is not even supported by theoretical conclusions by people that study this.
I fully get supporting a cause you FEEL good about doing and I get supporting one because the USA is a world power, I even get supporting it if you aim to make money off if it.
What I do not get is misleading the folks in the USA and stirring up anxiety without cause.
Good material RAIDERS. 
I, for one, believe the "manner" in which we exited Afghanistan, and not the exit itself, portrayed significant weakness abroad that Putin took to his advantage. Amassing Russian troops on the Ukraine border evoked no response from the U.S. , other than for Biden to say the U.S. would not get involved, and would apply severe sanctions "if" Russia invaded. Biden even had the audacity ( stupidity) to exclaim publicly Russia would invade... What weakness... and "now" Biden is trying to assert himself by training Ukraine pilots and/or sending F-16s. What a dangerous game Biden is playing... upping the stakes when war has already broken out.. where was this resolve in the beginning..(this frustration of mine us not directed toward you)
I stand by what Robert Gates said about Biden. In so many words, the man is a dipsh*t , and leader of the free world. The English can attest to how a weak leader that coddled a dictator can have disastrous consequences ( Neville Chamberlain and Hitler, respectively)
@Rush51
I am okay with that analysis. However, I can make a very good case that Democrat Presidents have looked weak on the world stage for a very long time. Biden is just the latest example of this. Putting aside his incompetence altogether, he is just not good for being viewed as a sign of strength internationally.
I could take this back to JFK and the Cuban Missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs debacle. I can point to Carter and the hostage crisis. As soon as Reagan was elected they let the hostages go -- they knew he meant business. When Bush said, 'you are with us or against us' and if you harbor terrorists we will consider you with them. What did Syria do? Turned them away right at the border. They said, 'hey we applaud your cause, but we heard what the man just said and we know he is serious.' Obama and Russia and Crimea. Etc., etc.
This is a vast oversimplification. But the world views Democrats as weak militarily or, at least, lacking fortitude to do anything.
Whether they thought Trump was unpredictable or whether they respected his potential to do something -- he at least was more respected then Biden.
But bottom line -- I am not sure I completely agree that Afghanistan had much at all to do with Ukraine. Putin was just ready to do something because this had been boiling up for years. I have written on this elsewhere, but folks need to understand the history in that area and how much pro-Russia sentiment there is in parts of the area. Ukraine has been the most corrupt country in Europe for a long time. That stirs up even more pro-Russia ideas when the folks see corruption and money going away from the folks. Then couple that with NATO and Biden and USA regrouping. Putin saw that as advancement on Russia. Trump was not pro-NATO at all. So, I can make a good argument that those issues played a bigger role than Afghanistan did.
But again, not adding in a lot of detail and writing this real quick. Putin is getting older and he feels like it was time -- no matter what else was/was not going on with USA.
Not surprised, cracks inside the Russian forces are expected for the crude invasions of Ukraine by Vladimir Putin only for his personal ideology and insanity.
Similar to trump and his deluded MAGA-minions in that regard.
Very similar. After Trump loses yet again it will slowly begin to change, but not until
U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said Thursday that Ukraine’s “rightful place” is within the NATO military alliance.
British PM Rishi Sunak says Ukraine's rightful place is in NATO (cnbc.com)
There is the trend for Ukraine to become a member of NATO, it appears going that direction.
We can agree to disagree here, but I like what you had to say by and large. To expand on your comment, " Putin was just ready to do something because this had been boiling up for years, I think you are exactly. Putin is a man that once said the biggest calamity of the 20th century was the fall of the Soviet Communist Empire. IMHO, this is a man that wants to see himself revered by Russia next to those other "-in" Russian dictators (Stalin, Lenin).... and taking over previous "satellite" states of the Empire is his way of being revered. I just think he was being "very opportunistic" in his choosing of the time to make his move... A very weak leader in Biden was the opening that he needed..
Enabling Putin ? How so ? What actions were taken by Putin to advance his cause while Trump was president??
absolutely my veteran friend !
helsinki was the clincher
especially when chump dropped his skirt in front of putin
revealing his red white and blue american flag panties
then bent over in front of him with america watcching
and handed putin a bottle of lube
Sweden is soon to joint NATO, according to Pres. Biden who was speaking at commencement of U.S. Air Force Academy earlier today.
The only objection stand on the path for Sweden to become a new member of NATO is Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey. Perhaps, Biden has dealt with Erdogan in some critical bifurcations. But to strengthen the NATO alliance, the addition of Sweden will accomplish a lot.
Experts say Trump's actions weakened Ukraine, divided NATO and emboldened Putin to become more aggressive. He praised Putin invasion of Crimea and predicted that the rest of Ukraine would fall. Russia spend years preparing for another invasion even before Biden became president.
@Europa
This is an incorrect usage of the word 'bifurcations'. I am not sure exactly what word you meant to use here.
"...the addition of Sweden will accomplish a lot." Define 'a lot'?
Do you understand any of the reasons they have not joined before and any of the arguments against them joining now?
Or do you think they should join simply because of the emotional feelings that the Media and the Left have stirred up in the young folks there about Ukraine?
There are some good links that explain good reasons for them not joining if you are interested.
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