You're proving my point. Why hand the coin to the refs or the Cards, when it's in your hands and you control your own destiny? No one is saying you should go for two every time, but this was a special situation. Similar to going for 3 when you're on the road in an NBA game vs going for two (and a tie at home). The Packers were on the road, key offensive players were hurt, they had just made a miracle comeback, the Cards were stunned, it was the perfect time to go for two and the win. It's all about context/situation.
Exactly
Why take the chance of not even getting the ball again, the offense wasnt moving the ball
Give Rodgers 2yds to win the game
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Quote Originally Posted by begginerboy:
You're proving my point. Why hand the coin to the refs or the Cards, when it's in your hands and you control your own destiny? No one is saying you should go for two every time, but this was a special situation. Similar to going for 3 when you're on the road in an NBA game vs going for two (and a tie at home). The Packers were on the road, key offensive players were hurt, they had just made a miracle comeback, the Cards were stunned, it was the perfect time to go for two and the win. It's all about context/situation.
Exactly
Why take the chance of not even getting the ball again, the offense wasnt moving the ball
Get real guys, no NFL team would go for two in that situation. This is not indoor football, NCAA where a MAC team is playing against a top ranked team, nor the USFL.
GB just got a new life. They got all the momentum on their side. The only way they would lost the game is losing the coin toss, and Zona is able to score a TD in the first drive. Even for the 75 yards play in OT, it was a broken play. Palmer almost got sacked in that play.
It is a stupid call, if GB elected to go for two instead of the extra point.
Lets look at the scenarios the would have had to happen for GB to win that game:
Option 1----Kick the PAT and go to OT (GB wins toss)
1)Make PAT
2)Win coin toss
3)Score TD to win
Option 2---Kick the PAT and go to OT (Gb wins toss)
1)Make PAT
2) Win coin toss
3) Kick fg
4) Stop Zona
Options 3---Kick PAT and go to OT (Zona wins toss)
1)Make PAT
2)Stop Zona
3)Kick Fg to win
Options 4---Kick PAT and go to OT (Zona wins toss)
1) Make PAT
2) Hold Zona to FG
3)Kick fg to continue game or score TD to win
Option 5...Go for 2
1)Gain 2 yds to win the game
Going to OT forced multiple things to happen for GB to win....going for 2 GB needed to do just 1 thing
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Quote Originally Posted by gambling-devil:
Get real guys, no NFL team would go for two in that situation. This is not indoor football, NCAA where a MAC team is playing against a top ranked team, nor the USFL.
GB just got a new life. They got all the momentum on their side. The only way they would lost the game is losing the coin toss, and Zona is able to score a TD in the first drive. Even for the 75 yards play in OT, it was a broken play. Palmer almost got sacked in that play.
It is a stupid call, if GB elected to go for two instead of the extra point.
Lets look at the scenarios the would have had to happen for GB to win that game:
Option 1----Kick the PAT and go to OT (GB wins toss)
1)Make PAT
2)Win coin toss
3)Score TD to win
Option 2---Kick the PAT and go to OT (Gb wins toss)
1)Make PAT
2) Win coin toss
3) Kick fg
4) Stop Zona
Options 3---Kick PAT and go to OT (Zona wins toss)
1)Make PAT
2)Stop Zona
3)Kick Fg to win
Options 4---Kick PAT and go to OT (Zona wins toss)
1) Make PAT
2) Hold Zona to FG
3)Kick fg to continue game or score TD to win
Option 5...Go for 2
1)Gain 2 yds to win the game
Going to OT forced multiple things to happen for GB to win....going for 2 GB needed to do just 1 thing
From an ESPN article for all the guys saying McCarthy should not have gone for two:
McCarthy's mistake
The irony, of course, is that they're advancing at the expense of the Packers and coach Mike McCarthy, who leaves the postseason in the wake of another game management blunder. Last year, it was McCarthy's hyper-conservative decision-making early in the game which cost the Packers critical points they would need later in the contest.
This year, it was not going for two after the Hail Mary. Kickers hit 94.2 percent of their extra points this year; that figure rose to 97.6 percent indoors, and Crosby was 36-for-36 this year, so let's just be kind and say that Crosby's going to tie the game 98 percent of the time. (Vikings fans will tell you that no kick is automatic.) So 2 percent of the time, the Packers lose without ever getting to overtime.
If the Packers do go to overtime, they're going to be underdogs. The Cardinals were seven-point favorites heading into the contest; after taking out the vig, the implied odds from the Vegas money line suggested that the Packers had a 26 percent chance of winning the game. Green Bay had certainly played better than they had during Arizona's regular-season blowout in the previous matchup, but they had lost Randall Cobb and needed two Hail Mary completions to tie the game.
It's almost always better for the underdog to try to turn the game into a shorter contest. Taken to an extreme, if you're playing Steph Curry one-on-one and you start with the ball, it's better to play to one than 11, because you might fire off a jumper and get lucky, but you're not going to hit 11 shots over Steph without giving him the ball.
Even an aggressive estimate would suggest that the Packers had, say, a 40 percent chance of winning the game if it went into overtime. Factor in the aforementioned possibility of a missed Crosby extra point and you're down to a 39 percent shot if you kick the extra point. The chances of the Packers converting their two-pointer are almost definitely better than 39 percent. The league has converted 48.1 percent of its attempts over the past three years, with the Packers going 5-for-9. Give the Cardinals credit for a tough defense and take into consideration that the Packers don't have a great running game. You're still going to find it difficult to come up with a scenario in which the chances of winning the game heading into overtime are better than converting a two-pointer.
And if you really want, pretend for a moment that the percentages are tied. There's also the small matter of the M-word. If you believe that momentum is a meaningful concept in terms of how teams win and lose football games -- and I am admittedly skeptical -- why would you ever let the game slip into overtime? Having knocked the Cardinals onto the ropes with one of the more stunning sequences in playoff history and with a minute to figure out which play you wanted to run while referees reviewed the touchdown, why wouldn't McCarthy think that his chances of winning the game were better with one immediate play?
All things weren't equal, and that included Arizona's coaching advantage. McCarthy played it safe yet again, and it ended up costing his team another postseason in the prime of the 32-year-old Rodgers' career. He coached to put off losing as long as possible. Arians coached to win, and while it raised some eyebrows and nearly cost his team the victory, he made far more defensible decisions than his counterpart.
McCarthy's choice was safer and attracted far less attention, but that doesn't make his decision the correct one. Instead of going by the book, McCarthy could take a page out of Arians'. A lot of coaches should.
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From an ESPN article for all the guys saying McCarthy should not have gone for two:
McCarthy's mistake
The irony, of course, is that they're advancing at the expense of the Packers and coach Mike McCarthy, who leaves the postseason in the wake of another game management blunder. Last year, it was McCarthy's hyper-conservative decision-making early in the game which cost the Packers critical points they would need later in the contest.
This year, it was not going for two after the Hail Mary. Kickers hit 94.2 percent of their extra points this year; that figure rose to 97.6 percent indoors, and Crosby was 36-for-36 this year, so let's just be kind and say that Crosby's going to tie the game 98 percent of the time. (Vikings fans will tell you that no kick is automatic.) So 2 percent of the time, the Packers lose without ever getting to overtime.
If the Packers do go to overtime, they're going to be underdogs. The Cardinals were seven-point favorites heading into the contest; after taking out the vig, the implied odds from the Vegas money line suggested that the Packers had a 26 percent chance of winning the game. Green Bay had certainly played better than they had during Arizona's regular-season blowout in the previous matchup, but they had lost Randall Cobb and needed two Hail Mary completions to tie the game.
It's almost always better for the underdog to try to turn the game into a shorter contest. Taken to an extreme, if you're playing Steph Curry one-on-one and you start with the ball, it's better to play to one than 11, because you might fire off a jumper and get lucky, but you're not going to hit 11 shots over Steph without giving him the ball.
Even an aggressive estimate would suggest that the Packers had, say, a 40 percent chance of winning the game if it went into overtime. Factor in the aforementioned possibility of a missed Crosby extra point and you're down to a 39 percent shot if you kick the extra point. The chances of the Packers converting their two-pointer are almost definitely better than 39 percent. The league has converted 48.1 percent of its attempts over the past three years, with the Packers going 5-for-9. Give the Cardinals credit for a tough defense and take into consideration that the Packers don't have a great running game. You're still going to find it difficult to come up with a scenario in which the chances of winning the game heading into overtime are better than converting a two-pointer.
And if you really want, pretend for a moment that the percentages are tied. There's also the small matter of the M-word. If you believe that momentum is a meaningful concept in terms of how teams win and lose football games -- and I am admittedly skeptical -- why would you ever let the game slip into overtime? Having knocked the Cardinals onto the ropes with one of the more stunning sequences in playoff history and with a minute to figure out which play you wanted to run while referees reviewed the touchdown, why wouldn't McCarthy think that his chances of winning the game were better with one immediate play?
All things weren't equal, and that included Arizona's coaching advantage. McCarthy played it safe yet again, and it ended up costing his team another postseason in the prime of the 32-year-old Rodgers' career. He coached to put off losing as long as possible. Arians coached to win, and while it raised some eyebrows and nearly cost his team the victory, he made far more defensible decisions than his counterpart.
McCarthy's choice was safer and attracted far less attention, but that doesn't make his decision the correct one. Instead of going by the book, McCarthy could take a page out of Arians'. A lot of coaches should.
From an ESPN article for all the guys saying McCarthy should not have gone for two:
McCarthy's mistake
The irony, of course, is that they're advancing at the expense of the Packers and coach Mike McCarthy, who leaves the postseason in the wake of another game management blunder. Last year, it was McCarthy's hyper-conservative decision-making early in the game which cost the Packers critical points they would need later in the contest.
This year, it was not going for two after the Hail Mary. Kickers hit 94.2 percent of their extra points this year; that figure rose to 97.6 percent indoors, and Crosby was 36-for-36 this year, so let's just be kind and say that Crosby's going to tie the game 98 percent of the time. (Vikings fans will tell you that no kick is automatic.) So 2 percent of the time, the Packers lose without ever getting to overtime.
If the Packers do go to overtime, they're going to be underdogs. The Cardinals were seven-point favorites heading into the contest; after taking out the vig, the implied odds from the Vegas money line suggested that the Packers had a 26 percent chance of winning the game. Green Bay had certainly played better than they had during Arizona's regular-season blowout in the previous matchup, but they had lost Randall Cobb and needed two Hail Mary completions to tie the game.
It's almost always better for the underdog to try to turn the game into a shorter contest. Taken to an extreme, if you're playing Steph Curry one-on-one and you start with the ball, it's better to play to one than 11, because you might fire off a jumper and get lucky, but you're not going to hit 11 shots over Steph without giving him the ball.
Even an aggressive estimate would suggest that the Packers had, say, a 40 percent chance of winning the game if it went into overtime. Factor in the aforementioned possibility of a missed Crosby extra point and you're down to a 39 percent shot if you kick the extra point. The chances of the Packers converting their two-pointer are almost definitely better than 39 percent. The league has converted 48.1 percent of its attempts over the past three years, with the Packers going 5-for-9. Give the Cardinals credit for a tough defense and take into consideration that the Packers don't have a great running game. You're still going to find it difficult to come up with a scenario in which the chances of winning the game heading into overtime are better than converting a two-pointer.
And if you really want, pretend for a moment that the percentages are tied. There's also the small matter of the M-word. If you believe that momentum is a meaningful concept in terms of how teams win and lose football games -- and I am admittedly skeptical -- why would you ever let the game slip into overtime? Having knocked the Cardinals onto the ropes with one of the more stunning sequences in playoff history and with a minute to figure out which play you wanted to run while referees reviewed the touchdown, why wouldn't McCarthy think that his chances of winning the game were better with one immediate play?
All things weren't equal, and that included Arizona's coaching advantage. McCarthy played it safe yet again, and it ended up costing his team another postseason in the prime of the 32-year-old Rodgers' career. He coached to put off losing as long as possible. Arians coached to win, and while it raised some eyebrows and nearly cost his team the victory, he made far more defensible decisions than his counterpart.
McCarthy's choice was safer and attracted far less attention, but that doesn't make his decision the correct one. Instead of going by the book, McCarthy could take a page out of Arians'. A lot of coaches should.
Exactly...playing for overtime left so many unknowns, including maybe missing the kick or not even getting the ball again with a chance to win...which obviously happened...
Going for 2 gave you the only option in which you controlled 100% of the outcome
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Quote Originally Posted by begginerboy:
From an ESPN article for all the guys saying McCarthy should not have gone for two:
McCarthy's mistake
The irony, of course, is that they're advancing at the expense of the Packers and coach Mike McCarthy, who leaves the postseason in the wake of another game management blunder. Last year, it was McCarthy's hyper-conservative decision-making early in the game which cost the Packers critical points they would need later in the contest.
This year, it was not going for two after the Hail Mary. Kickers hit 94.2 percent of their extra points this year; that figure rose to 97.6 percent indoors, and Crosby was 36-for-36 this year, so let's just be kind and say that Crosby's going to tie the game 98 percent of the time. (Vikings fans will tell you that no kick is automatic.) So 2 percent of the time, the Packers lose without ever getting to overtime.
If the Packers do go to overtime, they're going to be underdogs. The Cardinals were seven-point favorites heading into the contest; after taking out the vig, the implied odds from the Vegas money line suggested that the Packers had a 26 percent chance of winning the game. Green Bay had certainly played better than they had during Arizona's regular-season blowout in the previous matchup, but they had lost Randall Cobb and needed two Hail Mary completions to tie the game.
It's almost always better for the underdog to try to turn the game into a shorter contest. Taken to an extreme, if you're playing Steph Curry one-on-one and you start with the ball, it's better to play to one than 11, because you might fire off a jumper and get lucky, but you're not going to hit 11 shots over Steph without giving him the ball.
Even an aggressive estimate would suggest that the Packers had, say, a 40 percent chance of winning the game if it went into overtime. Factor in the aforementioned possibility of a missed Crosby extra point and you're down to a 39 percent shot if you kick the extra point. The chances of the Packers converting their two-pointer are almost definitely better than 39 percent. The league has converted 48.1 percent of its attempts over the past three years, with the Packers going 5-for-9. Give the Cardinals credit for a tough defense and take into consideration that the Packers don't have a great running game. You're still going to find it difficult to come up with a scenario in which the chances of winning the game heading into overtime are better than converting a two-pointer.
And if you really want, pretend for a moment that the percentages are tied. There's also the small matter of the M-word. If you believe that momentum is a meaningful concept in terms of how teams win and lose football games -- and I am admittedly skeptical -- why would you ever let the game slip into overtime? Having knocked the Cardinals onto the ropes with one of the more stunning sequences in playoff history and with a minute to figure out which play you wanted to run while referees reviewed the touchdown, why wouldn't McCarthy think that his chances of winning the game were better with one immediate play?
All things weren't equal, and that included Arizona's coaching advantage. McCarthy played it safe yet again, and it ended up costing his team another postseason in the prime of the 32-year-old Rodgers' career. He coached to put off losing as long as possible. Arians coached to win, and while it raised some eyebrows and nearly cost his team the victory, he made far more defensible decisions than his counterpart.
McCarthy's choice was safer and attracted far less attention, but that doesn't make his decision the correct one. Instead of going by the book, McCarthy could take a page out of Arians'. A lot of coaches should.
Exactly...playing for overtime left so many unknowns, including maybe missing the kick or not even getting the ball again with a chance to win...which obviously happened...
Going for 2 gave you the only option in which you controlled 100% of the outcome
Couldn't agree more Pack1234!!!!!! They had the fans in total shock from the hail mary and all the momentum!! Going for two there was absolutely their best chance to win the game. I told my wife that as soon as the catch was made, not after the game.
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Couldn't agree more Pack1234!!!!!! They had the fans in total shock from the hail mary and all the momentum!! Going for two there was absolutely their best chance to win the game. I told my wife that as soon as the catch was made, not after the game.
Couldn't agree more Pack1234!!!!!! They had the fans in total shock from the hail mary and all the momentum!! Going for two there was absolutely their best chance to win the game. I told my wife that as soon as the catch was made, not after the game.
Yup...I was in a bar with hundreds of Bears fans rooting for Zona, and they even agreed with me...I said it right after he made the catch to go for 2
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Quote Originally Posted by sugabear:
Couldn't agree more Pack1234!!!!!! They had the fans in total shock from the hail mary and all the momentum!! Going for two there was absolutely their best chance to win the game. I told my wife that as soon as the catch was made, not after the game.
Yup...I was in a bar with hundreds of Bears fans rooting for Zona, and they even agreed with me...I said it right after he made the catch to go for 2
I totally agree that going for 2 is the right call and thought so at the time. That ESPN article is a nice mental math exercise to prove the decision is correct but you don't really need it, it is a common sense strategical decision involving the previous game flow and scenarios (Cobb being out), the fact your on the road, and the control and momentum you have at that moment. The coaching staff should have already had a plan for what play you were going to call and the play should have been snapped and executed as soon as possible to maximize the shock affect the fans and Arz team was experiencing.
And the logic of those suggesting kicking the XP because your defense was playing lights out fails an earlier test. With around 3 mins left in the game score 17-13 Arz, GB went for it on 4th and 5 on there own 25 yard line. This was a far more risky and certain decision to not trust your defense. You punt and the same defensive performance that resulted in forcing a 3 and out but with a FG and now a 20-13 scoreboard requiring a TD to tie would have resulted an Arz punt (and likely better filed position) with the score 17-13. You also would have had much more time on the clock to score what would have been the game winning TD.
Not sure why this isn't clear as day. The coaching staff strategy was a logical failure. I would grade the decision to go for it on 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line a worse failure. The only upside for that decision is a first down and keeping the drive alive, vs. the downside of requiring the same defensive stand you would need on the punt but this time it results in -3 vs. -7 points for you team. Also if he punts there then McCarthy still isn't responsible for the loss, if the defense doesn't hold Arz wins 17-13 and it was the entire teams fault.
In hindsight would you rather have the advantage of shock and momentum with what amounts to a 4th and 2 from the goal line (the 2 pt conversion) with a planned great play called vs. a 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line with only a chance to lose the game.
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I totally agree that going for 2 is the right call and thought so at the time. That ESPN article is a nice mental math exercise to prove the decision is correct but you don't really need it, it is a common sense strategical decision involving the previous game flow and scenarios (Cobb being out), the fact your on the road, and the control and momentum you have at that moment. The coaching staff should have already had a plan for what play you were going to call and the play should have been snapped and executed as soon as possible to maximize the shock affect the fans and Arz team was experiencing.
And the logic of those suggesting kicking the XP because your defense was playing lights out fails an earlier test. With around 3 mins left in the game score 17-13 Arz, GB went for it on 4th and 5 on there own 25 yard line. This was a far more risky and certain decision to not trust your defense. You punt and the same defensive performance that resulted in forcing a 3 and out but with a FG and now a 20-13 scoreboard requiring a TD to tie would have resulted an Arz punt (and likely better filed position) with the score 17-13. You also would have had much more time on the clock to score what would have been the game winning TD.
Not sure why this isn't clear as day. The coaching staff strategy was a logical failure. I would grade the decision to go for it on 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line a worse failure. The only upside for that decision is a first down and keeping the drive alive, vs. the downside of requiring the same defensive stand you would need on the punt but this time it results in -3 vs. -7 points for you team. Also if he punts there then McCarthy still isn't responsible for the loss, if the defense doesn't hold Arz wins 17-13 and it was the entire teams fault.
In hindsight would you rather have the advantage of shock and momentum with what amounts to a 4th and 2 from the goal line (the 2 pt conversion) with a planned great play called vs. a 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line with only a chance to lose the game.
I totally agree that going for 2 is the right call and thought so at the time. That ESPN article is a nice mental math exercise to prove the decision is correct but you don't really need it, it is a common sense strategical decision involving the previous game flow and scenarios (Cobb being out), the fact your on the road, and the control and momentum you have at that moment. The coaching staff should have already had a plan for what play you were going to call and the play should have been snapped and executed as soon as possible to maximize the shock affect the fans and Arz team was experiencing.
And the logic of those suggesting kicking the XP because your defense was playing lights out fails an earlier test. With around 3 mins left in the game score 17-13 Arz, GB went for it on 4th and 5 on there own 25 yard line. This was a far more risky and certain decision to not trust your defense. You punt and the same defensive performance that resulted in forcing a 3 and out but with a FG and now a 20-13 scoreboard requiring a TD to tie would have resulted an Arz punt (and likely better filed position) with the score 17-13. You also would have had much more time on the clock to score what would have been the game winning TD.
Not sure why this isn't clear as day. The coaching staff strategy was a logical failure. I would grade the decision to go for it on 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line a worse failure. The only upside for that decision is a first down and keeping the drive alive, vs. the downside of requiring the same defensive stand you would need on the punt but this time it results in -3 vs. -7 points for you team. Also if he punts there then McCarthy still isn't responsible for the loss, if the defense doesn't hold Arz wins 17-13 and it was the entire teams fault.
In hindsight would you rather have the advantage of shock and momentum with what amounts to a 4th and 2 from the goal line (
2 pt conversion) with a planned great play called vs. a 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line with only a chance to lose the game.
Very good point
To me it was a no-brainer...take your chances kicking the PAT and hoping things go your way in OT, or have one chance to gain 2yds with Aaron Rodgers
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Quote Originally Posted by JBone_Texas:
I totally agree that going for 2 is the right call and thought so at the time. That ESPN article is a nice mental math exercise to prove the decision is correct but you don't really need it, it is a common sense strategical decision involving the previous game flow and scenarios (Cobb being out), the fact your on the road, and the control and momentum you have at that moment. The coaching staff should have already had a plan for what play you were going to call and the play should have been snapped and executed as soon as possible to maximize the shock affect the fans and Arz team was experiencing.
And the logic of those suggesting kicking the XP because your defense was playing lights out fails an earlier test. With around 3 mins left in the game score 17-13 Arz, GB went for it on 4th and 5 on there own 25 yard line. This was a far more risky and certain decision to not trust your defense. You punt and the same defensive performance that resulted in forcing a 3 and out but with a FG and now a 20-13 scoreboard requiring a TD to tie would have resulted an Arz punt (and likely better filed position) with the score 17-13. You also would have had much more time on the clock to score what would have been the game winning TD.
Not sure why this isn't clear as day. The coaching staff strategy was a logical failure. I would grade the decision to go for it on 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line a worse failure. The only upside for that decision is a first down and keeping the drive alive, vs. the downside of requiring the same defensive stand you would need on the punt but this time it results in -3 vs. -7 points for you team. Also if he punts there then McCarthy still isn't responsible for the loss, if the defense doesn't hold Arz wins 17-13 and it was the entire teams fault.
In hindsight would you rather have the advantage of shock and momentum with what amounts to a 4th and 2 from the goal line (
2 pt conversion) with a planned great play called vs. a 4th and 5 from your own 25 yard line with only a chance to lose the game.
Very good point
To me it was a no-brainer...take your chances kicking the PAT and hoping things go your way in OT, or have one chance to gain 2yds with Aaron Rodgers
The packers suck. They had no chance on winning against Carolina so what difference does it make. The packers defense was the strength of the team and got burnt. Its Over. let it go.
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The packers suck. They had no chance on winning against Carolina so what difference does it make. The packers defense was the strength of the team and got burnt. Its Over. let it go.
Only a packer fan would say the should have went for 2 and a stupid packer fan at that. A packer fan that knows football knows tht no one is going for 2 in that situation after u just got a miracle play ot would b retarded. You say they should have went for 2 cuz they lost in overtime but if they went for 2 and lost after a mircale play u woulda have been saying fire Mccarthy that was stupidest call ever we had all the momentum.
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Only a packer fan would say the should have went for 2 and a stupid packer fan at that. A packer fan that knows football knows tht no one is going for 2 in that situation after u just got a miracle play ot would b retarded. You say they should have went for 2 cuz they lost in overtime but if they went for 2 and lost after a mircale play u woulda have been saying fire Mccarthy that was stupidest call ever we had all the momentum.
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